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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
In Search of A Legal Framework for the Remote 
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Remote sensing by satellite! is a new technology for detecting natural 
resources and conditions on the Earth from space. 2 This outer space science is 
still in its infancy, but it has been compared to the microscope in its potential 
for revolutionizing science. 3 Remote sensing is already credited with a num-
ber of accomplishments. 4 In all, more than one hundred countries have used 
remote sensing data,5 and within a few years, remote sensing will become a 
major industry.6 
This Comment analyzes the legal and political problems related to remote 
sensing and suggests an approach to them. The author first traces the growth 
1. "Remote sensing by satellite" is the "acquisition of information about objects or 
phenomena in the surficial environment (including land, oceans and atmosphere) through the 
use of sensory devices at positions separated from (remotely situated) the subject under study; in-
volves measurements of electromagnetic radiation, acuustic:al energy, force fields, or nuclear 
radiations." N. SHORT, P. LOWMAN, JR., S. FREDEN & W. FINCH JR., MISSION TO EARTH: 
LANDSAT VIEWS THE WORLD 449 (1976) rhereinafter cited as SHORT & LOWMAN]. Remote 
sensing by satellite is further defined in § II infra. In this article, the terms "remote sensing." 
"remote sensing by satellite," "resource sensing," and "teledetection" are used interchange-
ably. 
2. Hopkins, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing of Earth Resources By Satellite, 78 MIL. L. REV. 57 
(1978) rhereinafter cited as Hopkins]. 
3. DeSaussure, Remote Sensing By Satellite: What Future For an International Regime?, 71 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 707 (1977) rhereinafter cited as DeSaussure]. 
4. Ifft & Doyle, Scientific and Legal Aspects of International Cooperation in Remote Sensing, in PRO· 
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 271, 273 (M. 
Schwartz ed. 1979) rhereinafter cited as Ifft & Doyle]. Many nations have benefitted from remote 
sensing. Bangladesh has used remote sensing to pinpoint land accretion in the Bay of Bengal. /d. 
Egypt relied on the "eye in space" to prospect for iron ore deposits. !d. Iran employed the 
satellite to monitor urban growth in the vicinity of Teheran. /d. Thailand now manages its forests 
with the aid ofteledetection techniques. /d. The Sudan uses information provided by remote sen· 
sors to construct the Jonglei Canal water project and Norway is developing hydroelectric power 
with the assistance of remote sensing data. /d. Australia uses satellite images to map its reefs and 
shoals. !d. For other examples, see Hopkins, supra note 2, at 65. 
5. Ifft & Doyle, supra note 4, at 273. 
6. Vlasic, Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites, in I MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 303, 306 (N. 
J asentuliyana and R. Lee eds. 1979) rhereinafter cited as Vlasic]. 
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ofteledetection. 7 He then examines the legal issues involved in remote sensing 
and considers the disputes arising between sensing' and sensed8 nations be-
cause of this technology. This examination includes the controversy surround-
ing the dinemination of satellite-gathered data, and the efforts made in the 
United Nations to reach a multilateral agreement. The author finally con-
siders the political aspects of the controversy, and suggests an incremental ap-
proach to developing a legal framework for remote sensing. 
II. REMOTE SENSING SATELLITES 
Remote sensing by satellite is "a methodology to assist in characterizing the 
nature and/or condition of phenomena on, above or below the Earth's surface 
by means of observations and measurements from space platforms. Specifical-
ly at present, such methods depend on the emission and reflection of electro-
magnetic radiations. "10 The technical aspects of remote sensing systems are 
beyond the scope of this Comment, II In basic terms. however. nations deploy 
a sensing device in an orbiting satellite, The device uses electromagnetic 
radiation to gather data on conditions on Earth, II The device then transmits 
the data down to ground stations for computer procelling and analysis, Six-
teen such ground stationa presently exist on Earth," 
The United States launched the first remote sensing satellite (Landsat) in 
1972.14 Since that time, the United States has launched several additional 
Landsats. U Landsat D, due to be launched by the National Aeronautic. and 
Space Administration (NASA) in 1981, will orbit the Earth fourteen times 
daily at an altitude of approximately 570 miles,1I Thi. satellite will have the 
ability to detect objects on Earth as small as thirty meters acroll. 17 This 
capability is an improvement over current satellites, which are capable of a 
ground resolution of between 50 and 80 meters. II 
7. For an example of the ule of the term 1,1"'''Ie'IOII in connection with remote lenllnl, SII 
Galloway, T,I"',lHlloII qf B.,,1t RISOIII'm by S."m"" In PROCBBDINGS OF THB SIXTBBNTH COLLo. 
QUIUM ON THB LAW OF OUTBa SPAOB 90 (M. Schwan. ed. 1974). 
B. "Senllnl" natlonl have remote tenllnl equipment. The United State. il a len.inl nation. 
Vlaalc, lupl'll note 6, at 305. 
9. "Senled" natlonl are the lubjectl of Icanninl and detection activitiel conducted from 
Ipace.ld. 
10. Boureiy, Rmlo" S'IIII", qf B.,,1t RlSoII,,"ljrom all", S/JGCI - A BllroP,.1I Appro.clt IG I,. L",AI 
Impli,.,iolll, 23 NBTHBaLANDS INT'L L. RBV. lBO, 183 (1976) rhereinafter cited al Bourilyj. 
11. For a copnt Iclentlflc explanation of the operation of a remote lenllnl IYltem, III SHORT 
& LoWMAN, IUPI'II note I, at 437·41. 
12. DeSauliure, IUPI'II note 3, at 707. SII .Iso SHoaT at LOWMAN, IUpl'll note I, at 1·3. 
13. 1m at Doyle, III/JI'tI note 4, at 271. 
14. Hopklnl, IUPI'II note 2, at 59. 
1 S. Vlallc, IU/JI'tI note 6, at 90S. 
16. Id. NASA A"IUI,i,I, Feb. 1979, at 16. 
17. Id. 
lB. Characterlltici and Capabllltiel olSenlora for Earth Relourcel SurveYI, 92 U.N. GAOR, 
Committee on the Peaceful Utel of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. AIAC 105/20., at 15 (1977). Thll 
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The Soviet Union also operates survey devices in space. 19 These devices are 
mounted on the manned Soyuz-Salyut orbital stations, in contrast to Ameri-
can remote sensing satellites, which are free sailing. 20 The United States had 
an earlier start in both military and civil applications of these devices,21 and in 
1976 a Staff Report of the United States Senate Committee on Aeronautical 
and Space Sciences asserted that the Russians lagged behind in remote sensing 
technology.22 Though the Soviet Union has launched a large number of 
satellites (approximately 100 per year),23 "technologically U.S. [sic] satellites 
are more sophisticated and reliable (e.g., longer lifetime in orbit) than Soviet 
systems. Consequently, the U.S. needs to launch many fewer satellites than 
do the Soviets. "24 
France is another major power interested in remote sensing. The French 
government plans to launch "Satellite Probative d'Observation de la Terre" 
(SPOT) in 1983. 25 By the time it reaches orbit, SPOT may be the world's 
most advanced teledetection device. 26 
III. LEGAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY REMOTE SENSING 
A. Overview 
Laws relating to remote sensing come from several sourcesY In a study of 
remote sensing regulation, however, one commentator concluded that all ex-
information is contained in Table I ("Sensor Parameters"), id. at 14-15. The term "resol~tion" 
when used in connection with remote scanning commonly appears in the phrases "ground 
resolution" or "spatial resolution." It means "the minimum distance between two or more adja-
cent features or the minimum size of a feature that can be detected and separated from its sur-
rounding features." SHORT & LOWMAN, supra note I, at 448. 
19 .. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 304. 
20. [d. 
21. STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 94TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., I SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-1975, OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE, MANN-
ED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS, CIVIL AND MILITARY ApPLICA-
TIONS, PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS, 377 (1976). 
22. /d. at 367. 
23. Oversight: President's Civilian Space Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Science and Technology. 
United States House rif Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979) (statement of Dr. Frank Press, 
Director, U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy). 
24. [d. 
25. The French SPOT system will research terrestrial vegetation, coastal pollution, and 
mineral resources. SPOT will have a resolution of 10 to 20 meters, superior to that of the 
American Landsats. DeSaussure, supra note 3, at 721. 
26. [d. 
27. One source of remote sensing regulation is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Ac-
tivities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, done at Moscow, London and Washington, Jan. 27, 1967. T.I.A.S. No. 6347,610 
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty1. The Outer Space Treaty provides some 
very broad guidance in the area of remote sensing. See S I1I.D infra, notes 44-46. U.N. resolutions 
affirming the right of each nation to sovereign control over its own natural resources have been 
considered basic propositions from which more controversial theories concerning a nation's right 
to control information about its natural resources have been advanced. In addition, the Legal 
Sub-Committee ofthe U.N. Committee On The Peaceful Uses Of Outer Space has formulated a 
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isting law is general and fails to address the problems posed by teledetection. 28 
The present legal structure is deficient, and this deficiency has contributed to 
growing disagreement and concern over resource satellites and their future. 29 
With the entry of more nations into the remote sensing debate, the problems 
are likely to grow more acute. 30 
B. Use of Data Collected Through Remote Sensing 
Remote sensing involves the flow of data through four distinct phases: col-
lection, processing, interpretation, and dissemination. 31 The primary legal 
difficulties concerning teledetection relate to data interpretation and dis-
semination.32 The interpretation of material gathered through sensing is not of 
great concern to developed nations with sophisticated computers and person-
nel trained in dealing with satellite data; however, the unrestricted interpreta-
tion and dissemination of remote sensing information is a vital issue for the 
developing countries. 33 These nations have rich deposits of natural resources, 
but lack the means to decode valuable satellite data. This concern is fun-
damental, but "a more reasonable definition of that concern might reasonably 
be expressed as an anxiety that others, whether governments, corporations or 
individuals, may be able through superior technology to learn more about the 
resources of a country than can the government or the people of that 
country. ' '34 
C. Remote Sensing as a Violation of Territorial Sovereignty 
Less developed nations fear that the sovereign right to control their own 
natural resources may be threatened by countries with precise data on the 
resources of the Third World. 35 The Indian representative to the Twentieth 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space36 expressed this anxiety when he 
set of draft principles intended to govern the operation of rpmotp ,pminrr wstems. Ser § TTl F. 
irifra. 
28. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 95. 
29. Id. 
30. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
31. DeSaussure, supra note 3, at 707. 
32. "Of all the issues raised during examination of the legal implications of remote sensing 
thus far, the most interest, whether legal, political, economic, or technical, and the most diversity 
of opinion have focused on questions of how data and information from remote sensing should be 
disseminated and handled." Stowe, The Development of International Law Relating to Remote Sensing of 
the Earth From Outer Space, 5.J. SPACE L. 101, 105 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stowel. 
33. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 81. 
34. Stowe, supra note 32, at 107. 
35. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 81-82. 
36. The Colloquia on the Law of Outer Space are held yearly under the auspices of the Inter-
national Institute of Space Law of the International Aeronautical Federation. During these ses-
sions, space scientists and scholars from around the world discuss legal and technical issues rele-
vant to space exploration. Twenty-one colloquia have been held since the first in 1958. 
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warned his colleagues from the wealthier, more advanced states that 
data collected by remote sensing can be used by countries, big cor-
poration(s), and cartels as a tool for economic exploitation. The 
powerful trusts, the large companies controlling natural resources 
and consumer goods, can use information provided by remote sen-
sors and direct not only their buying and selling policies, but also 
use their power over foreign energy and mineral sources and force 
them to grant development rights under financial pressure applied 
to certain sectors - for instance, by means of loans to foreign 
countries where the natural resources have been detected. This 
could eventually lead to "servitude" among nations. 37 
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As a matter of international law, a nation has the right to control its own 
resources; they are "subject to the sovereignty of the State in which they are 
found. "38 Nevertheless, nations disagree as to the right of each nation to con-
trol sensitive information about its own natural resources or wealth. 39 This 
controversy is central to the debate over the use of earth remote sensing 
satellites. 40 
D. The Rights oj Sensed States vs. the Rights oj Sensing States 
1. The Restrictive Theory 
Two basic positions have evolved with respect to the use of processed 
satellite data: the restrictive and the "open data" positions. The Soviet 
Union, along with France, Argentina and Brazil,41 has maintained that only 
the sensed nation may determine if and how information gathered about it 
37. Andhyaru jina, Remote Sensing oj Earth Resources - Whether A Tooljor Financial Intervention And 
Exploitation, in INT'L INST. OF SPACE L. OF THE INT'L ASTRONAUTICAL FED'N 520, 521 (M. 
Schwartz ed. 1978) fhereinafter cited as Andhyarujina]. 
A servitude is a right held by one state to the use of the territory of another, or a restriction on a 
state's use of its own territory enforceable by another state. D. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 
(1970). 
38. Moore, Earth Resources Satellites, A Puzzlejor the United Nations, 16 HARV. INT'L L . .1.648, 
650 (1975). The proposition is drawn from traditional ideas of sovereignty, and has been en-
dorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. See G.A. Res. 626. 7 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 20) 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural R~sources 
of Developing Countries and Expansion of Domestic Sources of Accumulation For Economic 
Development, G.A. Res. 2692, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 63 U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). 
39. Polter, Remote Sensing And State Sovereignty, 4.1. OF SPACE L. 99, 106-07 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Polter]. 
40. !d. at 107. Polter remarks that "what is really at stake is the right oj dispo;al of information 
concerning natural resources, with widely divergent interpretations of state sovereignty at the 
center of the controversy." ld. See also note 48, infra, for a discussion of conceptions of sovereignty 
in the Space Age. 
41. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 319-20. For changes in the Brazilian position see Hahn, Developments 
Toward a Regimejor Control oj Remote Sensingfrom Outer Space, 12.1. OF INT'L L. & ECON. 421, 441-42 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Hahn]. See also § V irifra. 
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may be disseminated;42 the "prior consent" of the sensed nation would be re-
quired before the sensing state could disseminate any data obtained by 
satellite. 43 Proponents of this restrictive position, however, cannot rely on the 
broad principles of the Outer Space Treaty of 196744 as support for a legal 
regime on remote sensing responsive to the desires of sensed states. The Outer 
Space Treaty mandates freedom of exploration in space,45 but does not cover 
resource surveys or their effects. 46 The Outer Space Treaty is therefore an in-
42. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 319-21. This position is presented in two separate documents. 
France and the Soviet Union produced "Draft Documents Governing the Activities of States in 
the Field of Remote Sensing of Earth Resources by Means of Space Technology," 29 U. N. 
GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. AlAC. 105/C.2/L.99 
(1974) rhereinafter cited as Franco-Soviet Draft Documents]. The Franco-Soviet draft provides 
that "rthe sensing nation] should not give publicity to rremote sensing] information, ror1 pass the 
information to other countries or international organizations without clear consent of the country 
which possesses these natural resources and should not use the information in any other way 
harmful to the state." Bordanov, Practical Use of Space Vehicles in the Light of the Principle rif State 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW 
OF OUTER SPACE 103, 105 (M. Schwartz ed. 1974) rhereinafter cited as Bordanov]. 
Argentina and Brazil jointly issued a draft' 'Treaty on Remote Sensing of Natural Resources 
by Means of Space Technology," 29 U. N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, U.N. Doc. AlC. 111047 (1974). The Argentina-Brazil draft is virtually identical to the 
Franco-Soviet document, except that the Argentinians and Brazilians seek contml not only over 
the dissemination of gathered remote sensing data, but also purport to control whether their ter-
ritories are to be sensed in the first place. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 319-20. 
43. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 319-20. Put simply, "prior consent" means that the state operating 
the remote sensing satellite must obtain the permission of a nation which is to be its target before 
the resulting data are disseminated. /d. 
44. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 27. The Outer Space Treaty was concluded in 1967 with 
the objectives of preserving freedom of exploration in outer space, denying claims of national 
sovereignty over the moon and other celestial bodies and encouraging international cooperation 
in such matters as the protection and safe return of astronauts. 
Article I, paragraph 2 of the Outer Space Treaty provides that "outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without 
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law , and 
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies." /d. art. I, para. 2. 
Article II states that "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means or use or occupation, or by any other 
means." /d. art. II. 
Article III binds States to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and well-settled 
international law in their trips into space. /d. art. III. 
Article V assures that astral explorers will be returned safely to their homelands when they 
return to earth. /d. art. V. There is no indication that these broad principles were intended to 
govern remote sensing in space. Gorove, Earth Resources Survry Satellites and the Outer Space Treaty, 1 
]. OF SPACE L. 80-81, 84 (1973) rhereinafter cited as Gorove, Outer Space Treaty]. Teledetection 
equipment was still on the drawing boards in 1967 when the Outer Spa<;e Treaty was signed. 
Landsat A made its debut in 1972. /d. at 81. 
45. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 27, art. I, para. 2, quoted in note 44, supra. 
46. Gorove, after a thorough analysis of the Outer Space Treaty and the arguments for its ap-
plication to remote sensing, concludes that "not only does the use of such resources survey 
satellites seem permissible with no indication that any sovereign rights are violated, but there 
equally appears no stipulation prohibiting the use and dissemination of the data collected." 
Gorove, Outer Space Treaty, supra note 44, at 85. 
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adequate body of law for the regulation of remote sensing, and restrictive 
theorists have concentrated instead on the concept of state sovereignty as a 
means of limiting the conduct of the sensing states. 47 Vereshetin, a prominent 
Russian spokesman, has stated that "rfJreedom of outer space should not be 
interpreted as an unrestricted right to any space activities .... Freedom of 
outer space should not be used as a pretext for violating sovereign rights of 
states on the earth." 48 
2. The Open Data Theory 
The United States and the industrialized nations of England and West Ger-
many share a different view of satellite-obtained data. 49 These nations believe 
that all states, the sensing as well as the sensed, should be free to make use of 
any information gathered by remote sensing units. 50 They maintain that inter-
national law allows them to conduct their present research, and, for support, 
point to the absence of remote sensing regulation in the Outer Space Treaty.51 
Thus, proponents argue that nations may use Earth-oriented satellite pro-
grams to sense other nations and may disseminate freely the data thus ob-
tained. 52 Proponents also urge the' 'open data" position on technical grounds, 
both scientific (e.g., the fact that no place on Earth is ever constant in relation-
ship to space beyond the atmosphere53) and legal (e.g., the fact that the Outer 
47. Vereshchetin, On the Principles oj Stale Sovereil!nty in International Space Law, in II ANNALS OF 
AIR AND SPACE LAW 429,436 (N. Matte ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Vereshchetin]. 
48. !d. Advocates of the restrictive view of remote sensing regulation also assert that states 
have a sovereign right to control all information pertaining to their natural resources. See Stowe, 
supra note 32, at 105; Polter, supra note 39, at 106-07; Vlasic, supra note 6, at 319-21. 
Old claims of sovereignty over outer space itself have now been abandoned since all nations 
have consented to the flight of space objects over their territories. Gorove, Sovereignty and the Law oj 
Outer Space Re-Examined, in II ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 311, 313 (N. Matte ed. 1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Gorove, Soverez:gnty]. 
Under ancient Anglo-Saxon doctrine of usque ad coelum, territorial sovereignty was thought to 
extend upward to infinity. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 77. The development and deployment of 
space technology steadily eroded this doctrine and Article II of the Outer Space Treaty specifical-
ly rejects claims of sovereignty over space. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 27, quoted in note 
44, supra. Scientific evidence also acted to deflate the usque ad coelum theory. Hopkins, supra note 2, 
at 77-78. As a result of the evolving examination of sovereignty in space, "traditional aspects of 
territorial sovereignty ... have been abolished in relation to outer space." The fact remains, 
however, that "functional aspects of sovereignty, the exercise of sovereign rights and similar 
manifestations continue to be recognized." Gorove, Sovereignty, supra note 46, at 321. Those op-
posed to the unrestricted expansion of remote sensing activities rely, therefore, not upon theories 
of sovereignty over space but on the principle of territorial sovereignty on earth. This explains 
their insistence that resource survey satellites are not engaging in outer space exploration but per-
forming earth-related functions from space. !d. at 434-36. 
49. Polter, supra note 39, at 106. 
50. !d. at 105-06. 
51. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 307. 
52. !d. 
53. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 77-78. See also the statement of United States Ambassador W. 
Tapley Bennet, Jr. before the First Committee (Political & Security) of the United Nations Gen-
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Space Treaty provides that outer space' 'is not subject to national appropria-
tion by clqim of sovereignty"54). According to some experts, any attempt to 
restrict satellites either through assertions of unlimited upward territorial 
sovereignty or limitations on data dissemination would force the dismantling 
of existin& remote sensing programs, or so reduce their value as to render 
them worthless. 55 
The United States has done more than merely assert that its data gathering 
activities fall within its rights under customary international law or applicable 
multilateral treaties. It has made the world-wide availability of remote sensing 
capability a top priority of the American teledetection program,56 and has in-
dicated its willingness to share its data interpretation technology with the rest 
of the world. 57 This commitment has already resulted in free distribution of all 
interpreted data, and in the training of others to interpret information, par-
ticularly in the developing countries. 58 
E. Multilateral Treaty Efforts in the United Nations 
1. Chronology 
Whether a sensing nation needs the consent of a sensed one before it may 
interpret and disseminate data on the sensed nation's natural resources and 
eral Assembly, October 13, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Bennet] cited in Vlasic, supra note 6, at 322, 
that "[t]he natural swath of the satellite sensors commonly cuts across many national 
boundaries. ' , 
54. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 27, art. II, quoted in note 44, supra. But note that the defini-
tion of "outer space" is not yet agreed upon. See Hopkins, supra note 2, at 76-80. 
55. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 97-98. Vlasic also suggests that "strong espousal by the United 
States of the policy of open access to data may well be dictated by the requirements of the 
[U]nited [S]tates Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1977)]. Given the broad scope 
of this Act, the United States government might find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
accept an international agreement which would tend seriously to abridge the freedom of 
American nationals to obtain data on natural resollrrp, o:"thprpn hy " t"Y-'"pportrn A mprir"n 
space enterprise." Vlasic, ,upw note 6, at 323. 
56. Hahn, supra note 41, at 438-42. 
57. !d. at 442. 
58. !d. The United States has been "the only space power that [has] ever shared openly the in-
formation received from space activities. Indeed, this openness [has] extended to linancing and 
training others, particularly the developing countries, so that they also could make optimum use 
of remote sensing technology." [d. American aid in this area has even extended to efforts to help 
India develop an independent remote sensing capability. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF SPACE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONCERNING THE FURNISHING OF LAUN-
CHING AND ASSOCIATED SERVICES FOR INDIAN NATIONAL SATELLITE SYSTEM-I SPACECRAFT, July 
18, 1978,30 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 9285; MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN 
THE NATIONAL REMOTE SENSING AGENCY (NRSA), GoVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE UNITED 
STATES NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA), January 3, 1978, 29 
U.S.T. 4688, T.I.A.S. No. 9074. 
For more general information on the transfer of American remote sensing technology and 
training to other nations, see 11ft & Doyle, supra note 4. 
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other sovereign properties remains unsettled. 59 Arguments continue as to 
whether the t 967 Outer Space Treaty was intended to govern remote sensing 
programs. 60 Buffeted by couflicting national claims, the United Nations has 
struggled to formulate general guidelines reconciling the restricted and 
unrestricted remote sensing positions. 61 
The United Nations first became interested in the legal ramifications of 
remote sensing in the late 1960's.02 A 1969 U.N. General Assembly Resolu-
tion63 called for sharing of teledetection technology and international coopera-
tion in remote sensing efforts.64 At the outset of the 1970's, the Working 
Group of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS)65 concerned itself primarily with the technical and scientific 
aspects of resource surveying. 66 However, in 1971 the COPUOS Working 
Group began to consider differing national views on the uses of remote sens-
ing,67 and by 1975 the Committee had turned its attention toward the solution 
of relevant legal problems. 68 The General Assembly instructed the Legal Sub-
Committee of COPUOS to examine the legal implications of remote sensing 
of the Earth from space. The Committee was to consider the various national 
views on the subject, and was to include proposals for draft international 
59. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 101. See also notes 42-43, supra. 
60. Gorove, Outer Space Treaty, supra notc 44. See also § III.D supra; Hopkins, supra note 2, at 
101. 
61. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 303, 325. 
62. /d. at 312-13; Hopkins, supra note 2, at 92. As early as 196/l, at the U.N.-sponsored Inter-
national Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held at Vienna, 
Austria, the United Nations recognized that a sound political and legal environment was ne~d~d 
if remote sensing was to develop into a program capable of benefitting all interested nations. 
Vlasic, supra note 6, at 312. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, Vice-President and Scientific Chairman of the 
Conference stated: 
As these programmes develop, it will clearly be of the utmost importance to give serious 
and timely consideration to the international implications and to the setting up of 
suitable organizational arrangements, possibly through the United Nations or special-
ized agencies, to ensure that the interests of all nations are safeguarded, and that they 
can obtain maximum benefit from such programmes irrespective of political, 
ideological or economic differences. 
[d. For a thorough chronology of United Nations actions in the area of remote sensing, see id. at 
312-18. 
63. G.A. Res. 2600, 24U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 11, U.N. Doc. AI7630(J969). 
64. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 313-14. 
65. The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was formed ad hoc 
on December 13, 1958 by General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII). It was made permanent the 
following year. G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 5, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). 
In 1973 the number of participating members was increased from 28 to 37. The latest expansion 
occurred in 1977, when the membership was increased to 47. See G.A. Res. 32/1968, 32 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 62, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977). 
66. Vlasic, supra note 7, at 313. See also G.A. Res. 2733C, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 20, 
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
67. /d. 
68. ld. at 314. 
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agreements. 69 The Legal Sub-Committee considered proposals for such in-
struments in sessions held in 1976,7° 1977,71 and 1978.72 The Committee 
neither received nor considered any new proposals in 1979. 73 By the close of 
the Legal Sub-Committee meetings of 1980, committee members had proposed 
seventeen draft principles relating to remote sensing of the Earth from space. 74 
The Committee had reached tentative agreement on eight of these 
principles. 75 
2. The Work of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS at its 
Nineteenth Session (1980) 
The Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS tentatively agreed upon draft prin-
ciples76 including several directives to states. The states are to carry out their 
remote sensing activities "for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries";77 to conduct their researches in accordance with internationallaw;78 
69. G.A. Res. 3234, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 14, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
70. G.A. Res. 3388, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 14, U.N. Doc. AIl0034 (1975). Pur-
suant to this resolution, the Working Group of COPUOS was instructed to initiate the "drafting 
of principles in regard to those particular areas of the subject where common elements in the 
views of States are identified." /d. at 14. Five such principles (discussed in detail, § III.E.2 infra) 
were formulated during the May, 1976 session of the Working Group. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 
315. 
71. Six additional draft principles (discussed in detail, § III.E.2 infra) were produced by the 
Working Group of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS during its session of March 14 
through April 8, 1977. /d. at 317. 
72. At the conclusion of the Legal Sub-Committee session on April 7, 1978, seventeen draft 
principles (discussed in detail, § III.E.2 infra) on remote sensing had been formulated. 
COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Seventeenth Session, Annex III, U.N. 
Doc. AIAC 105/218 (1978). 
73. COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, Annex I and 
Annex IV, Sec. A, U.N. Doc. AIAC 105/240 (1979). 
74. COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Nineteenth Session, Annex II and 
Annex II Appendix, U.N. Doc. AIAC 105/271 (1980) rhereinafter cited as Nineteenth Session 
U.N. Report]. 
75. /d. Annex I, at 1. 
76. Before complete formal consensus is accorded any principle, it must have a final reading in 
COPUOS. No principle has gone through this procedure. See Mossinghoff & Fuqua, United Na-
tions Principles on Remote Sensing: Report on Developments 1970-1980, 8J. SPACE L. 103, 104 (1980) 
rhereinafter cited as Mossinghoffl. 
/d. 
77. Nineteenth Session U.N. Report, supra note 74, Principle II, Annex II Appendix, at 7. 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space and international cooperation in that 
field r shall] r should] be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, ir-
respective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and taking into con-
sideration, in international cooperation, the particular needs of the developing coun-
tries. 
78. /d. Principle II, Annex II Appendix, at 8. 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space r shall] r should] be conducted in accord-
ance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and the 
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to promote international cooperation in remote sensing activitiesj 79 to share all 
data relevant to protecting the natural environment of the Earth j80 and to 
"make available technical assistance to other interested States on mutually 
agreed terms.' '81 The Sub-Committee also agreed to accept the provisions of 
Principle VII, which establishes a supervisory role for the United Nations in 
the remote sensing field j82 Principle X, which instructs sensing states to pro-
vide "technical information involving possible operational systems" to other 
nationsj 83 and Principle XVI, which provides that remote sensing activities 
"be conducted with respect for the principle of full and permanent sovereignty 
of all states ... over their own wealth and natural resources. "84 This latter 
ld. 
/d. 
Itl. 
/d. 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the relevant instru-
ments of ITU. 
79. /d. Principle IV, Annex II Appendix, at 8. 
1. States carrying out programmes for remote sensing of the earth from outer space 
[shouldl [shalll promote international cooperation in these programmes. To this end, 
sensing States [shouldl [shalll make available to other States opportunities for participa-
tion in these programmes. Such participation should be based in each case on equitable 
and mutually acceptable terms due regard being paid to principles. 
2. In order to maximize the availability of benefits from such remote sensing data, 
States are encouraged to consider agreements for the establishment of shared regional 
facilities. 
80. /d. Principle V, Annex II Appendix, at 8. 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space [shouldl [shalll promote the protection 
of the natural environment of the earth. To this end States participating in remote sens-
ing [shouldl [shalll identify and make available information useful for the prevention of 
phenomena detrimental to the natural environment of the earth. 
81. [d. Principle VI, Annex II Appendix, at 8. 
States participating in remote sensing of the earth from outer space [shouldl [shalll 
make available technical assistance to other interested States on mutually agreed terms. 
82. /d. Principle VII, Annex II Appendix, at 9. 
1. The United Nations and the relevant agencies within the United Nations system 
should promote international cooperation, including technical assistance, and playa 
role of coordination in the area of remote sensing of the earth. 
2. States conducting activities in the field of remote sensing of the earth [shalll 
[shouldl notify the Secretary-General thereof, in compliance with article XI of the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 
ld. 
[d. 
83. /d. Principle X, Annex II Appendix, at 9. 
States participating in remote sensing of the earth either direcdy or through relevant 
international organization [shalll [shouldl be prepared to make available to the United 
Nations and other interested States, particularly the developing countries upon their re-
quest, any relevant technical information involving possible operational system which 
they are free to disclose. 
84. [d. Principle XVI, Annex II Appendix, at 10-11. 
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Principle thus recognizes that considerations of sovereignty in the sensed 
sta!es play an important role in regulating the activities of the sensing nations. 
The Sub-Committee had tentatively approved these eight principles when 
the Nineteenth Session set them aside "for the time being" to consider more 
controversial provisions. 85 The Session also quickly reached a tentative agree-
ment on Principle VIII. This Principle provides for the sharing of teledetec-
tion data in the event of an impending natural disaster. 86 The term "natural 
disaster" is "subject to further discussion, "87 but the basic meaning of it is 
clear. 88 
Most of the work of the Legal Sub-Committee during the 1980 meeting 
focused on the remaining eight principles. Principle I, which attempts to 
define "remote sensing of the Earth," "primary data," and "analyzed infor-
mation," is still the subject of controversy. 89 Two important stumbling blocks 
rWithout prejudice to the principle of the freedom of exploration and use of outer 
space, as set forth in article I of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, remote sensing of the earth r should] r shall] be conducted with respect 
for the principles of full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their 
own wealth and natural resources r with due regard to the rights and interests of other 
States and their natural and juridical persons in accordance with international law ] r as 
well as their inalienable right to dispose of their natural resources] rand of information 
concerning those resources].] 
!d. 
!d. 
ld. 
85. !d. 
86. Nineteenth Session U.N. Report, supra note 74, Principle VIII, Annex II Appendix, at 9. 
Remote sensing of the earth from outer space should promote the protection of man-
kind from natural disaster. To this end, States which have identified primary data from 
sensing of the earth and/or analysed information in their possession which would be 
useful in helping to alert States to impending natural disasters or in assisting States to 
deal with natural disasters should, as promptly as possible, notify those States affected 
or likely to be affected of the existence and availability of such data and/or information. 
Such data and/or information should, upon request, be disseminated as promptly as 
possible. 
87. /J. 
88. See Mossinghoff, supra note 76, at 117-18. 
89. Nineteenth Session U.N. Report, supra note 74, Principle I, Annex II Appendix, at 7. 
For the purpose of these principles with respect to remote sensing of the natural 
resources of the earth and its environment: 
(a) The term "remote sensing of the earth" means "remote sensing of the natural 
resources of the earth and its environment." 
(b) The term "primary data" means those primary data which are acquired by 
satellite-borne remote sensors and transmitted from a satellite either by telemetry in the 
form of electromagnetic signals or physically in any form such as photographic film or 
magnetic tape, as well as preprocessed products derived from those data which may be 
used for later analysis. 
(c) The term "analysed information" means the end-product resulting from the 
analytical process performed on the primary data as defined in paragraph (b) above 
combined with data and/or knowledge obtained from sources other than satellite-borne 
remote sensors. 
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are the phrasing of definitions and general disagreement on whether' 'primary 
(raw) dala" and "analyzed (processed) data" need to be distinguished. 90 It 
may be important to draw a distinction between these terms because such a 
distinction could' 'facilitate a solution to the delicate question of establishing a 
regime of free or restricted dissemination of the results of remote sensing ac-
tivities.' '91 The failure of the Legal Sub-Committee to settle upon basic defini-
tions is noteworthy since it leaves the other proposed principles necessarily 
vague.92 
Principle IX, which instructs sensing states to undertake research "in a 
manner compatible with the legitimate rights and interests of other states,' '93 
provoked a controversy over whether the provision was redundant, since 
similar sentiments existed in Principles II and III. 94 Principle XI assigns inter-
national responsibility to sensing states for their remote sensing operations. 95 
The U. N. Report tersely announced that" no consensus could be reached in 
the course of the discussion as to the retention or deletion of this principle. "96 
Principle XII would guarantee the sensed states access to remotely gathered 
raw ("primary") data. 97 However, the conferees reached no agreement on 
specific guarantees of access; nor could they agree on extending access to proc-
essed, i. e., analyzed, information. 98 
[d. 
90. !d. Annex II, at 1-2. 
91. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 325. 
92. [d. 
93. Nineteenth Session U.N. Report, supra note 74, Principle IX, Annex II Appendix, at 9. 
Taking into account the principles II and III above, remote sensing data or infonna-
tion derived therefrom [shall] [should] be used by States in a manner compatible with 
the legitimate rights and interests of other States. 
94. See id. Annex II, at 3. 
95. [d. Principle XI, Annex II Appendix, at 9. 
[States [shall] [should] bear international responsibilities for [national] activities of 
remote sensing of the earth [irrespective of whether] [where] such activities are carried 
out by governmental [or non-governmental] entities, and [shall] [should] [guarantee 
that such activities will] comply with the provisions of these principles.] 
!d. "International responsibility" is a complicated area of international customary law. "Short-
ly, the law of responsibility is concerned with the incidence and consequences of illegal acts, and 
particularly the payment of compensation for loss caused." BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC IN· 
TERNATIONAL LAW 432 (3d ed. 1979). For further explanation of international responsibility, see 
id. at 431-77; Wiewiorowska, Some Problems of International Responsibility in Outer Space Law, 7 J. 
SPACE L. 23 (1979). 
96. Nineteenth Session U.N. Report, supra note 74, Annex II, at 3. 
97. !d. Principle XII, Annex II Appendix, at 9. 
[A sensed State [shall] [should] have timely and nondiscriminatory access to primary 
data obtained by remote sensing of the earth from outer space, concerning its territory, 
on [agreed] reasonable terms and [no later than] [before] access is granted to any third 
State. [[To the greatest extent feasible and practicable,] this principle shall also apply to 
analysed information.]] 
[d. 
98. See id. Annex II, at 3-4. 
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Principle XIII provoked sharp debate. The debate centers on whether a 
sensing state must notify a sensed state in advance that the sensed state is to be 
the subject of remote surveillance. 99 Some delegations advocated prior 
notification on the ground that remote sensing would otherwise interfere with 
the sovereignty of sensed states. Opponents of this view argued that' 'remote 
sensing by satellite per se does not involve the question of sovereignty of 
states. "100 The Legal Sub-Committee concluded that "there was no agree-
ment on the text of this principle. "101 Principle XIV would require, at the 
sensed state's request, consultation between a sensed and a sensing state con-
cerning teledetection. lo2 This Principle, too, would seem to raise numerous 
questions of sovereignty and data collection and dissemination, but it 
engendered little debate in the Legal Sub-Committee. l03 
Principle XV orders that sensing states refrain from disseminating informa-
tion on the natural resources of sensed states to third 'parties without the con-
sent of the sensed state. 104 The conferees reached no agreement with respect to 
Principle XV for the same reasons: There is no clear consensus for a regime of 
open access, or for a regime of restricted access to remotely gathered informa-
tion .105 Nations like the United States find these types of provisions un-
workable, since they are too expensive technically and too restrictive scien-
tifically.l06 Alternatively, many states view unrestricted access to data as an 
impingement on national sovereignty.107 These contrasting viewpoints repre-
ld. 
/d. 
[d. 
99. /d. Principle XIII, Annex II Appendix, at 10. 
rr A State which intends to conduct remote sensing of the earth from outer space shall 
give advance notification to the States whose territory will be sensed.] r A State r intend-
ing to conduct] rconducting] remote sensing activities of the earth from outer space shall 
notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations and r upon request] the States whose 
territory is intended to be covered by such activities r to the fullest extent feasible and as 
soon as practicable] of the intended launch, r nature of the] mission, duration and cover-
age of such activities. The Secretary-General shall publish information thus received. 11 
100. /d. Annex II, at 4-5. 
101. /d. at 5. 
102. /d. Principle XIV, Annex II Appendix, at 10. 
rA State carrying out remote sensing of the earth rshall] r should] without delay con-
sult with a State whose territory is sensed upon request of the latter in regard to such ac-
tivity, rin particular dissemination of data and information,] in order to promote inter-
national cooperation, friendly relations among States and to enhance the mutual bene-
fits to be derived from this activity.] 
103. See id. Annex II, at 5. 
104. /d. Principle XV, Annex II Appendix, at 10. 
rStates carrying out remote sensing of the earth shall not, without the approval of the 
States whose territories are affected by these activities, disseminate or dispose of any 
data or information on the natural resources of these States to third States, international 
organizations, public or private entities.] 
105. See id. Annex II, at 5. 
106. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 322. 
107. /d. at 320. 
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sent the basic conflict. lOB 
The last of the draft principles, Principle XVII, calls for generalized conflict 
resolution procedure should a dispute between nations arise out of remote 
sensing activities. 109 However, in this situation, nations could not settle on 
even preliminary wording for the Principle, and much of the provision was left 
at the rough draft stage. IIO 
COPUOS has labored over the draft principles on remote sensing since 
1976,111 putting the principles through numerous changes. But resolution of 
the basic disagreements seems no closer than before. 112 The record of the 1980 
Legal Sub-Committee meetings shows that the goal of reaching an agreement 
on principles will not be met soon. At this time, "the deliberations of the 
Outer Space Committee fsicl have revealed little support for the interna-
tionalization of remote sensing as a means of resolving the major concerns of 
states. "113 The problem centers on a lack of consensus among member states 
with respect to United Nations participation,1I4 rather than on a lack of com-
munication. "Until such consensus is reached, there will be more studies, 
more reports for the Committee to comment upon but no concrete recommen-
dation for a specific United Nations role. "115 This statement, made before a 
single principle had been formulated, "is as valid today as when it was origi-
nally written.' '116 
IV. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE REMOTE SENSING CONTROVERSY 
The record of the Outer Space Committee, the short name for COPUOS, 
reflects conspicuous failure. Although the purpose of the Committee was to in-
108. Id. at 319. 
109. Nineteenth Session U.N. Report, supra note 74, Principle XVII, Annex II Appendix, at 
11. 
Id. 
[Any dispute that may arise with respect to the application of [activities covered by] 
these principles [shall] [should] be resolved by prompt consultations among the parties 
to the dispute. Where a mutually acceptable solution cannot be found by such consulta-
tions it [shall] [should] be sought through other [established] [existing] procedures for 
the peaceful means of settlement of disputes mutually agreed upon by the parties con-
cerned.] 
110. See id., Annex II, at 6. 
111. Pursuant to G.A. Res. 3388,30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 14, U.N. Doc. A/I0034 
(1975). See note 70, supra. 
112. See Vlasic, supra note 6, at 334, 335. For a convenient collection of the texts of the draft 
proposals prior to 1980, see Mossinghoff, supra note 76, at 119-53. 
113. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 331. Another commentator affirms this conclusion, stating that 
"an international treaty on remote sensing seems no closer now than at the ERTS-I Earth 
Resources Satellite-Landsat I launching in 1972." Hahn, supra note 41, at 424. 
114. Robinson, The United Nations as an International Forumfor Developing Consensus, in LEGAL IM-
PUCATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 192 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Robinson]. 
115. Id. 
116. Robinson, supra note 114 cited in Vlasic, supra note 6, at 328. 
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crease the speed and effectiveness of the making of international law, the 
CO]Ilmittee soon became "as ineffective as any of the bodies it was expected to 
surpass in productivity." 117 Between 1971 and 1978 it produced only one 
agreement,118 and has been unable to formulate a definition for "space 
object,"P9 or even "outer space."120 Even the definition of the apparently 
simple term "natural disaster" remains "subject to ... discussion. "121 This 
record casts doubt on the wisdom of seeking broad-based solutions to the com-
plex problems of remote sensing. At least one commentator has questioned the 
potential of existing mechanisms for the development of international space 
law to produce a legal system that will keep pace with technological 
developments. 122 
Negotiations for m~or multilateral agreements are subject to the changing 
dynamics of global politics. 123 A workable set of remote sensing principles 
must accommodate the "open data" views of the United States and most 
developed nations, the "restricted data" views of the Soviet Union and 
France, and the shifting, though predominantly "restricted data" sympathies 
of the developing nations. 124 Of basic importance is the fact that 
each of these three groups of states negotiating in the international 
arena seeks a result consistent with its own internal political re-
quirements. The Soviet Union, because of its socialist nature, 
must ensure in its negotiations that the outcome to which it agrees 
is consistent with its own ideological purpose. A federalist country 
such as the United States, not bound by any rigid political or eco-
nomic dogma, seeks flexibility. The developing nations, pointing 
to a history of exploitation, assert that they are entitled to all the 
advantages on an equal basis with those possessing the 
technology. 125 
The positions taken by the three major groups on the issues of control and 
dissemination of remote sensing data thus ITf'nf'rally reflect the iJeulugical 
117. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 334. 
118. Convention on Registration of Objects T ,~Ilnched into Outer Space,.J anuary 14, 1975. 28 
U.S.T. 695 (1975). 
119. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 334. 
120. See, e.g., Kopal, The Question of Defining Outer Space, 8.J. SPACE L. 154 (1980). 
121. See § III.E2 supra. 
122. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 334. 
123. Hahn, supra note 41, at 425. 
124. [d. 
125. !d. The political equation has achieved a precarious balance in the United Nations 
because the nations with the technology (the U.S. and, to a much lesser extent, the U.S.S.R.) 
must seek the support of the numerically superior developing nations. The ability of the super-
powers to push their respective positions on remote sensing regulation through the U. N. is thus 
offset by the volatile majority of Second and Third World states. !d. 
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system to which each group adheres. 126 Americans generally believe that hav-
ing an unimpeded flow of information about minerals, crops, population and 
other teledetectable variables is both beneficial and consistent with their 
"open" value system. 127 The Soviet position differs. The Soviets feel that 
"freedom of space" has never been construed to mean an unrestricted 
freedom to conduct all activities in outer space. 128 The developing states fear 
both direct and indirect exploitation of their natural resources,129 and there-
fore, have often supported the restrictive position. 130 The opposition of the 
French to an "open data" regime is difficult to reconcile with their status as a 
developed Western nation, since their industrialized European neighbors sup-
port such a system. Nonetheless, the French opposition further complicates an 
already complex situation. 131 
Although the United Nations is vulnerable to international political ten-
sions, it is hardly surprising that no comprehensive remote sensing treaty has 
been forthcoming, or that, due to the lack of progress towards such a treaty, 
the United Nations has "assumed the role of monitor rather than 
126. Polter, supra note 39, at 111-15, provides a useful analysis of a state's attitude towards in-
formation, including a comparison of "closed" and "open" national value systems, and their ef-
fect on divergent state positions with regard to remote sensing regulations. The attitudes of the 
Soviets and Americans towards the dissemination of remote sensing data may be said to vary as a 
result of their differing conceptions of the need for information. Polter argues that the Marxist 
social model is "closed," and reflects a preconceived value system. 
Information is not essential for the individual governed by a preconceived system of 
values. He who possesses unquestionable truth does not necessdrily need to know more. 
Information is merely incidental. On the other hand, within the framework of an open 
system of values it is essential to inform the individual, since he can only arrange hi, ac-
tual existence in an appropriate manner on the basis of information. In order to realize 
his opportunity for development and advancement it is necessary to give him access to 
as much information as possible. The United States and the other developed Western 
nations do not accept a closed social model. They therefore have less difficulty in sup-
porting an unrestricted flow of remote sensing information. 
!d. at 114. 
127. Polter, supra note 39, at 114. The United States has supported the free distribution of in-
formation both internally and internationally. See § III.D.2 supra. The United States Freedom of 
Information Act,S U.S.C.A. § 552 (1977), is an additional example. See also Vlasic, supra note 6, 
at 323. 
128. Vereshchetin, supra note 47, at 432-33. 
129. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 82-83. See also Kimminich, Der Internationale Schutz dPl' Einzelnen, 
15 ARCHIV F. VOLKERRECHT 413 (1971-72); Hueckling, The Strategy of Semantics and the "Mankind" 
Provisions of the Space Treaty, 7 J. SPACE L. 15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bueckling]. The essence 
of the Kimminich-Bueckling argument is that fledgling governments in the Third World are 
often unstable and subject to wavering political allegiances. They guard their newly-found 
sovereignty with extreme jealousy and are suspicious of any intrusion into what they perceive as 
rightfully theirs. Bueckling, supra at 22. 
130. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 82-83. 
131. See Polter, supra note 39, at 106. It is only possible to speculate as to the reasons. The 
French do not yet have an operational remote sensing system, and may intend to slow develop-
ment of a worldwide system until they have one. French reluctance to accept the open data posi-
tion may abate once SPOT goes into service. See § II. supra. 
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supervisor. "132 Perhaps the United Nations should abandon hopes for im-
mediate comprehensive regulation of remote sensing data disposal and 
dissemination, and concentrate instead on administrative efforts designed to 
"benefit the technology and promote its widest possible usage. "133 
V. THE MOVEMENT OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS TOWARDS SUPPORT FOR 
UNRESTRICTED REMOTE SENSING DATA DISSEMINATION 
Political and ideological considerations will play an important role in any 
future agreement concerning national sovereignty and conditions for the use 
of remote sensing information. The developing nations are of central impor-
tance in this process. They could benefit significantly from the knowledge 
generated by remote sensing. m On the other hand, they fear that their natural 
resources will be exploited by the developed countries, either directly or in-
directly, by misusing teledetection data. 135 Administrative and political' 
leaders are concerned that the results of teledetection surveys will allow the 
developed nations, which command the satellites, to exploit the weaker 
developing states. U6 
Superior knowledge in the hands of the industrialized nations does not 
necessarily translate into physical control of Third World resources under in-
ternationallaw, but this has not lessened the anxieties of the leaders of non-
industrialized states. Their concerns over data dissemination remain inex-
tricably linked to aspects of national sovereignty.137 Less developed nations, 
largely dependent upon mineral and biological resources for economic sur-
vival, fear economic imperialism. us At the same time, industrialized states 
hesitate to invest in Third World development, fearing that the developing 
states will fail to honor their commitments and international agreements, or 
will nationalize foreign investments without adequate compensation. 139 In this 
132. Hahn, supra note 52, at 457. 
133. /d. A notable example of an administrative effort in the field of remote sensing is the at-
tempt of the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space to organize and coordinate programs facilitating international cooperation in the use 
and transfer of resource survey technology. The U.N. also collects and disseminates information 
about national and regional remote sensing operations. 1m & Doyle, supra note 4, at 276-77. 
134. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 81. 
135. /d. at 81-82. The fear of exploitation was expressed even before the first Landsat remote 
sensing satellite was launched in 1972. /d. Contemporary news accounts reveal that Argentina 
supported a Swedish proposal that the small, non-space powers seek assurances of protection 
from economic exploitation by nations collecting satellite data. Teltsh, Space Plans Frustrate the 
'Have-Nots', N.Y. Times, May 14, 1972, at 15, col. 1. 
136. MorIey, IntmuJtiotllJl OrganizationJor Rmwte Sensing - A Cordian Knot?, in II ANNALS OF 
AIR AND SPACE LAw 423-24 (N. Matte ed. 1977). 
137. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 81. Seealso Stowe, supra note 32, at 105; Moore, supra note 38, at 
650-51. 
138. Andhyarujina, supra note 37, at 521. 
139. /d. at 521-22. 
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delicate situation, remote sensing can play a valuable role in economic 
development by pinpointing promising areas for investment. 140 
Although Third World intransigence is a continuing problem, the attitude 
of the developing states toward the use of remote sensing is changing. Some 
states have indicated a desire to share in the promise of remote sensing. HI 
Resource managers are pressing for the increased use of teledetection as a 
developmental tool. I42 Mindful of the fact that remote sensing satellites will 
continue to operate even in a time of legal and diplomatic uncertainty, 143 
many nations are beginning to view more favorably the American position 
that "open data dissemination to all interested parties is in fact more likely to 
enhance than to diminish the ability of states to control their natural 
resources. "144 In addition, opposition to an open data system will probably 
diminish once developing states realize that (1) under international law , they 
will have control over their natural wealth, and (2) equal access to remote 
sensing data reduces the potential for economic exploitation. 145 
Brazil has been a noteworthy convert to this viewpoint. Brazil had, along 
with Argentina, been part of the Latin American block adhering to the 
Franco-Soviet "restricted data" approach. 146 In discussions before the United 
Nations, the Brazilians continued to side with opponents of unfettered expan-
sion of research survey technology. However, Brazil concluded a bilateral 
agreement with the United States which reversed their protectionist position 
and accepted the U.S. policy of "open data. "147 The United States also con-
ducted negotiations with the People's Republic of China in January, 1980, for 
the purpose of establishing a ground station in China to receive Landsat data. 
140. Id. at 523. 
141. Ifft & Doyle, supra note 4, at 276. 
142. Morley, supra note 136, at 423-24. 
143. Stowe, supra note 32, at 108. 
144. Id. at 106. 
145. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 84. The worldwide record of use ofremote sensing data may 
help in this process. In the six-plus years of widespread international use ofteledetection informa-
tion, two American researchers profess that "we have yet to learn of any significant adverse 
economic effect on any country." 11ft & Doyle, supra note 4, at 274. 
146. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 319-21. See also Franco-Soviet Draft Documents, supra note 42. 
147. In an agreement with the United States, the Brazilians consented to an "open data policy 
comparable to that of NASA and the other U.S. agencies participating in the program such that 
catalogs of all data processed, as well as the data themselves are made publicly available as soon 
as practicable to the domestic and international community." See BRAZIL: MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN BRAZILIAN INSTITUTO DE PESQUISAS ESPACIAIS AND THE UNITED 
STATES NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, March 27,1973,24 U.S.T. 898, 
901 T.I.A.S. No. 7600. This agreement was extended on March 22, 1976 and on May 26, i976. 
Hahn, supra note 41, at 441 n.69. Brazil now takes advantage of remote sensing technology, and 
has muted its formerly outspoken support for the prior consent of sensed states to teledetection 
activities, and for the right of developing nations to apply controls to the technological advance-
ment of remote sensing. Id. at 449. Similar bilateral agreements have been concluded between 
the U.S. and Italy, the U.S. and Zaire, the U.S. and Chile, the U.S. and Canada, and the U.S. 
and India. /d. at 441-42; Vlasic, supra note 6, at 323. 
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Another major developing nation thus became involved in the American 
rem.ote sensing program. H8 
Freedom of access to raw data will be of no value to developing nations 
unless these nations can also process the wealth of information transmitted 
from sateilites. 149 For this reason, many nations involved in discussions on 
remote sensing regulation have recognized the need for additional national 
and regional data processing facilities to interpret remote sensing satellite 
messages. 150 Better data interpretation capabilities will increase the value of 
teledetected information, and reduce the likelihood that the non-industrialized 
nations will be exploited. 151 
VI. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The efforts of the United States to convince less developed countries to ac-
cept Landsat technology and abandon the restricted data position might 
ultimately succeed if the United States can ensure that the recipients of remote 
satellite data will be able to make profitable use of it.152 The American effort is 
"based on the recognition that a persistence of a complete inequality in the use 
of outer space would result in tensions which would have a highly damaging 
effect on international relations in general. "153 
Teledetection offers a chance for significant improvements in the quality of 
life around the world. But if teledetection is ever to "achieve its full potential, 
the satellite technology of remote sensing will require a benign political and 
legal environment where all nations share in the benefits and, also feel that 
their important economic interests are protected adequately." 154 Though few 
nations oppose the development of a "benign political and legal 
environment," any broad multilateral treaty must resolve "long festering 
disagreements over the peaceful nature of ERS (earth remote sensing), data 
release and use, sovereignty and the role of the United Nations. "155 Progress 
towards an all-encompassing treaty on resource surveying from outer space 
148. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 6. 
149. Moore, supra note 36, at 654. 
150. IfTt & Doyle, supra note 4, at 276. 
151. /d. at 276. Two technical authorities on remote sensing observe that current programs, 
under the auspices of the U.S., the European Space Agency, the U.N. Economic Commission for 
Africa and the U. N. Outer Space Committee, focus on training of data interpretation personnel 
and the integration of remote sensing techniques "into projects which can benefit from the uni-
que capabilities of this technology." Id. 
152. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 85. 
153. Goedhius, LqtalImplications of the Use ~f Direct Broadcastin.1t and Remote Sensing Sateilites and 
Their Effect on International Relations, 23 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 162, 179 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Goedhiusl. This realization is seen as a hopeful sign, in that it places space concerns 
above the level of pettiness and political dispute characterized by the international. 
154. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 306-07. 
155. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 103. 
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has been slow, and thf> members ofthe United Nations, as already noted, have 
not been able to agree on even general principles for the regulation of 
teledetection. 156 
As a result of the stalemate in international negotiations, no regulations 
now restrict the expansion of remote sensing programs. 157 From the stand-
point of the scientific and technological communities, this might appear prom-
ising. In reality, however, a continuing legal vacuum could encourage a 
scaling-down of the American remote sensing program because potential 
disputes over data dissemination and national sovereignty threaten the pro-
gram's future. 158 Alternatively, unresolved legal problems might cause the 
United States to abandon all attempts to reach an international agreement and 
continue to develop remote sensing alone, without any international regula-
tion. 159 Either alternative is undesirable, particularly for the developing na-
tions which most need the valuable information remote sensing can 
provide. 160 
Additional difficulties might emerge in the absence of a workable remote 
sensing treaty. Some nations might claim sizable extensions of sovereignty in-
to space. 161 Individuals or states might bring legal actions alleging violations of 
privacy, or sovereignty, by resource survey satellites. 162 Some commentators 
also believe that states might seek relief by applying their own criminal laws to 
activities originating in outer space. 163 
156. Sohn, United Nations Decision-Makin,l!: Confrontration or Consemu:;?, 1;; HARV. INTI. L.J. 
438,445 (1974). The United Nations makes resolutions and drafts treaties through th ... device of 
consensus. [d. Agreements are not made final until there is universal, or near-universal arpr"v~l 
by the nations participating in negotiations. Such a system ensures that the final product of the 
decision-making body has a broad base of support. But the achievement of consensus is a 
laborious process, and the dangers inherent in this manner of decision-making are that "too 
slavish adherence to the principle of consensus might result either in postponing decisions in-
definitely even when delay might be catastropic, or in reaching ambiguous, vague decisions 
representing the lowest common denominator and leading to later disputes about their 
meaning." For a good description of the relationship between majority and minority positions 
within a group operating through a consensus process, see id. at 440-41. 
The use of consensus may eventually be successful ill formulating an agreement on remote sen-
sing, but the prospect for an early resolution of the dispute over tclerletection data dissemination 
appears slight. See Vlasic, supra note 6, at 311-12. 
157. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 311-12. 
158. !d. at 333. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. at 334. Several equatorial states have claimed sovereignty over airspace above their 
territorial possessions all the way up to 36,000 kilometers. Such a claim, if allowed, would give 
these nations ownership of portions of the geostationary orbit above their territories. These asser-
tions of ownership have not been accepted by other nations and have not been cited as a basis for 
objection to the use of outer space for remote sensing satellites. Still, an agreement in the United 
Nations might help to extinguish these exaggerated claims. !d. 
162. DeSaussure, supra note 3, at 719. 
163. See id. at 718-19. One commentator, drawing on the landmark case of The s.s. Lotus 
[19271 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10, has already suggested that the territorial basis for the exercise of 
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A binding international treaty on remote sensing would provide many 
benefits. A global accord would mute developing legal problems and harmon-
ize diverse interests. 164 Accepted principles would provide a basis for the regu-
lation of "foreseeable and perhaps unforeseeable developments in the fu-
ture. "165 With a "realistic and ... expeditious approach to the task offormu-
lating an international code of conduct for remote sensing from outer space, "166 
developing nations could share in the bounty of valuable resource information 
more readily. 
Despite these considerations, the record to date suggests that such a treaty is 
not close to agreement. 167 Thus, both developed and developing nations are 
likely to prefer some progress rather than continued failure. The failure of the 
United Nations in reaching an acceptable remote sensing accord has apparent-
ly spurred the pursuit of bilateral agreements betwe6n sensing and sensed 
states. 16S These treaties are more modest in scope, and nations reach these 
agreements more readily. Bilateral treaties may provide the foundation of a 
legal system for teledetection technology in the future. 169 Support for this 
"piecemeal" bilateral approach rests on a growing impatience with the prog-
ress of multilateral space treaties, and a sense that incremental movement 
through a number of smaller agreements may be a more solid basis for future 
development. Adrian Bueckling, a commentator particularly dissatisfied with 
jurisdiction in international law can be extended into outer space to regulate the activities of a 
satellite having a detrimental impact on a nation hundreds of miles beneath its orbit. /d. 
In Lotus, a French steamer and a Turkish ship collided in international waters. Eighf'Turkish 
sailors died in the tragedy. The Turkish government sought permission to try the watchman on 
board the French vessel on a charge of manslaughter for his criminal negligence in failing to 
foresee the imminent collision. The Permanent Court of International Justice granted the 
Turkish request on the grounds that if an act committed in international waters has a detrimental 
impact on a ship flying another flag, the injured flag state can regard the offense as having been 
committed in its own territory; it may then prosecute the offending vessel. /d. The traditional no-
tion of territorial sovereignty was thus extended to include acts not occurring within national 
political boundaries. This has come to be known as the "effects doctrine." The effects doctrine 
has been used to argue that a sensed nation affected by remote sensing, thus losing exclusive con-
trol over information concerning its natural resources, may bring an action against the sensing 
state. This would be true due to the fact that conduct by the state operating the satellite in free 
space produced harmful effects on the sensed state below. If such claims were allowed, a sensed 
state could invoke its own criminal law to decide upon a claim made by its own government or 
nationals. If a number of o~jecting sensed states took this course, a sensing state would be faced 
with defending its activities in litigation before hostile courts. Id. at 719. 
164. See id. at 723. 
165. Fiorio, International Implications of Earth Resources Surveys by Satellites, 1 J. SPACE L. I, 5 
(1973). 
166. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 334. 
167. Id. at 323. 
168. Vlasic, supra note 6, at 331. 
169. Bueckling, supra note 113, at 17-18. Support for bilateral and small-scale remote sensing 
agreements can also be found in Gorove, OuItrSpac, Trea!y, sU/Jra note 42, at 84; Stowe, supra note 
32, at 107. 
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the "soft" nature of international space law,170 expresses the hope that "the 
tendency to conceal unsolved legal problems under beautiful legal phrases will 
be put to an end, and that the generalized concepts will be replaced by more 
specific and substantial legislation which might gradually coalesce into a body 
of rules. "171 
Bilateral remote sensing agreements between sensing and sensed countries 
are creating a base of customary international law already. 172 This base may 
provide the necessary rules for continued progress in teledetection.173 The 
conclusion of limited pacts provides valuable bases upon which nations may 
eventually construct a global treaty. "The need to insure perpetuation of ex-
isting bilateral agreements will be paramount. Thus, the stumbling blocks to 
agreement will be removed and broad international agreement on the method 
of global utilization of the technology will become possible."174 
170. Bueckling, supra note 129, at 17-18, 22. This German judge is particularly distrustful of 
broad-based treaties, because they lack specific enforcement clauses and are therefore "soft" law, 
and because in his view they are built upon a flimsy foundation of platitudes and hollow phrases. 
171. /d. The result of this reliance on semantics is that: 
Space law in its present codification tries to give rules for the behavior of states in 
space in the form of generalized formulas. Time and again it becomes apparent how dif-
ficult it is to provide adequately phrased rules for, and to systematize in legal language, 
the extremely complicated subject matter created by the technological explorations in 
outer space and the resulting multitude of conflicting interest. Therefore, when in the 
search of compromise, generalized formulas are resorted to in order to accommodate 
such basic principles as the exploration and use of outer space . . . "for the benefit and 
in the interests of all countries"; "for peaceful purposes ... "; ... "without discrimina-
tion of any kind, on a basis of equality"; ... and in the interest of ... "promoting inter-
national cooperation and understanding"; with due regard to the corresponding in-
terests of all other states parties to the Treaty, it becomes evident that the law is bound 
to go off course on the ocean of facts. 
Id. at 17. 
Bueckling believes that more "specific and substantial legislation," is to be favored over the 
concealment of unsolved legal problems under "beautiful legal phrases." /d. at 22. He also 
believes that "specific and substantial legislation" is more easily achieved in a bilateral or 
regional agreement. Id. 
172. Hopkins, supra note 2, at 79-80. Practices common to the community of nations are said 
to crystallize into customary international law when the following occur: 
a) Concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of situation faIl-
ing within the domain of international relations. 
b) Continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time. 
c) Conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing interna-
tionallaw. 
d) General acquiescence in the practice by other states. 
DA PAM 27-161-1, para. II.A.l, at 9 (1964), cited in Hopkins, supra note 2, at 79 n.118. Hopkins 
contends that existing agreements and the practice of states allows sensing states to launch and 
orbit satellites without the prior consent of sensed states. Moreover, he sees this base as evolving 
and expanding over time. Hopkins, supra note 2. at 79-80. 
173. Hahn, supra note 41, at 456-57. 
174. /d. at 458. 
476 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV, No.2 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Remote sensing by satellite of conditions on the Earth is becoming a major 
outer space activity. Many countries around the world have benefited already 
from resource survey data received from space. With the advent of improved 
satellite systems, nations will have access to even more valuable information. 
Remote sensing activities are now loosely governed by the broad principles 
of the Outer Space Treaty and by general principles of international law . Ef-
forts to achieve a more specific legal system to regulate remote sensing have 
not kept pace with technological advances. Peaceful solutions to disputes over 
data dissemination and claims of sovereignty over natural resources informa-
tion are necessary, but multilateral treaty efforts made in the United Nations 
have met with little success. The politically charged nature of remote sensing 
regulation complicates the situation. Disputes between the sensed and sensing 
nations, particularly over national sovereignty and data dissemination, char-
acterize the political atmosphere. The recent movement of the developing na-
tions toward unrestricted resource survey data dissemination suggests that 
sensing and sensed nations may eventually establish an international legal 
framework to govern remote sensing. 
But, until the political atmosphere in the United Nations changes to one 
more conducive to the achievement of consensus on remote sensing regula-
tion, a comprehensive multilateral treaty is unlikely. In the absence of such a 
treaty, an incremental approach, combining bilateral agreements between the 
sensed and sensing states and the encouragement of regional cooperation 
under the auspices of the United Nations appears to be the best way to pro-
mote the growth of remote sensing while achieving- some basic solutions to the 
accompanying legal problems. 
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